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ABSTRACT 
Every colonisation and decolonisation process must of necessity be fraught with 
antagonistic contradictions which may differ in terms of their character and depth (the 
form) but not their essence. The class contradictions which were perhaps necessarily 
hidden in the Zimbabwean decolonisation process - but which now have become more 
open - need to be examined and laid bare by an objective social science. For, never is 
a social system in a state of permanent rest. So, the constant motion, its driving force 
and its direction need to be understood and used for the continual and betterment of 
the condition of human existence. This essay which characterizes the post-independence 
state in Zimbabwe as a neo-colonial one par excellence, holds that the armed struggle for 
the independence of Zimbabwe was led by a militant nationalist petty bourgeoisie whose 
material objective was to set itself up as a local dominant bloc presiding over a capitalist 
social economy dominated by imperialism. The question of a profound transformation of 
the society - sometimes, many times, articulated in the discourses of these nationalists and 
some social scientists as "a socialist transformation" - was never seriously on the agenda. 
The consequent Lancaster House Constitutional Conference of 1979, which brought 
about the Lancaster House Agreement, was simply the climax which started the "sealing" 
of an important class alliance that would ensure the reproduction of the heavily 
imperialist dominated socio-economic structure and that would demobilise any 
popular-based attempt at a profound transformation of the society. This process - of 
course - is still fraught with deadly contradictions. 
INTRODUCTION 
The empirical details of the actual "Road to Lancaster House" have been documented 
by several writers - see Mandaza (ed) 1986, his Introduction and Chapter I in this work; 
also Davidow 1984; Verrier 1986; Astrow, 1983; et al. Mandaza's objective, as he states 
it, was simply to explain "why things are what they are" (Mandaza, ibid., 5) and not to go 
beyond as Davies suggests (in Stoneman, 1988, 19-20), to what things "ought to be". 
Nevertheless, the Mandaza objective becomes a very difficult one since a discourse of 
his sort primarily lands one in a stalemate. In the drive to simply explain why things are 
what they are, one finds oneself making statements which do contain a yearning for "what 
ought to be" - perhaps inadvertently - but unless such statements are "stumbled upon" 
as it were, the mission becomes one of a near-systematised apologia for what exists. For 
how else can we explain the following bold positions by Mandaza: 
Euphoric and, perhaps, even more surprised at their discovery that Africans could in fact struggle and 
win total independence, these scholars (who have developed a romanticised view of the "African 
revolution", a view Mandaza calls "revolutionary mythology" - my addition) overlooked the complexity 
of both the struggle itself and the Southern African situation. Rather than re-examine those historical, 
socio-economic and strategic factors - indeed rather than try to understand the nature of both 
imperialism and the class forces that emerge as a result of its impact in Southern Africa - they are now 
more inclined to attribute all that has gone wrong to the African petit bourgeoisie without, however, 
identifying and analyzing the conditions which influence the action of this class, (ibid.) (my emphasis). 
There is some truth in the above position by Mandaza. Having stated that there are 
historical socio-economic and strategic factors in Southern Africa which influence the 
action of the African petty bourgeoisie - a class which should not take all the blame for 
what has gone wrong - he calls for our sympathy: 
These problems should be understood sympathetically in the light of a historical conjuncture within 
which these (imperialist) forces are still so dominant;... (ibid., 19). 
But this same petty bourgeoisie leading the nationalist movement is blamed for having 
had no "socialist thrust": 
For a socialist thrust would have required a clearly articulated ideology that would fully explain the 
historical reality of imperialism; reveal the class structure of the liberation movement; and constitute 
the basis for a vanguard party that would in turn inform, teach, guide and translate the political gains 
of national independence into an onward movement towards socialist construction. 
It would have required not only an acceptance that the masses - the peasants and workers - are the basis 
for such momentous processes of transformation, but also seeking to conscientise and mobilise them 
towards the socialist goal (ibid., 30). 
This really amounts to a statement of "what things ought to be or to have been" although 
Mandaza is not really keen to subject the African petty bourgeoisie to "criticism". For 
he continues: 
This may smack of a degree of historical determinism and voluntarism and yet it is difficult to understand 
how, in the context of the historical evidence before us, it should have been expected that an essentially 
nationalist movement could have developed a revolutionary capacity that would overthrow both white 
settlerism and imperialist hegemony (ibid). 
Surely, we do have a right to expect a modern nationalist movement to develop this way! 
But we know that these developments are determined in the field of the internal class 
struggle. The question is, what happened within the liberation movement which 
precluded this development? I think Mandaza's mission itself is contradictory and 
perhaps this is symptomatic of an even deeper contradiction - or is it fear: the "fear" to 
consistently subject to critique the dominant bloc of the petty bourgeoisie which has 
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hitherto been the agency of history.(l) Perhaps it is this fear which leads Mandaza to an 
unfortunate stagnation, which he expresses when he calls for "progressive planning for 
development" without even setting out the political pre-conditions for such "progressive 
planning for development" to be possible. Writes Mandaza: 
However, it behoves progressive intellectuals and political activists to identify, within the broad 
framework of the principal contradictions in our society, the possibilities for the development of a 
progressive development policy. The latter must seek to break ( ) with the structures of dependence 
and must rely on effective planning. It is a difficult and long-drawn task but one that has to be attempted, 
beginning with a clear perception of the causes of underdevelopment... (ibid., 18-19). 
And further: 
This raises the question about the need to develop not only appropriate planning skills in the state sector 
but also the correct orientation - and political will - to plan for socialism (ibid). 
Much as it is accepted that socialism requires planning for it, and much as it is accepted 
that this task is a difficult one requiring "political will"; much as it is accepted that the 
principal contradiction today in Zimbabwe is between the "masses of workers and 
peasants" on the one hand and imperialism with the local settler bourgeoisie on the 
other, nevertheless, a discourse which approximates an "apologia" for the ruling petty 
bourgeoisie cannot be accepted. Dependence, underdevelopment and imperialist 
hegemony, yes, these are the evils in Zimbabwe today, but to fight them, to supersede 
these, the historic role of the petty bourgeoisie under the domination by imperialism and in 
the reproduction of oppression and exploitation of workers and poor peasants that 
characterises it as a neo-colonial ruling class and its post-independence state as a 
neo-colonial state must be clearly understood. The term neo-colony denotes the 
subordination of this local ruling bloc to imperialist capital on the one hand and its 
important class alliance with the imperialist (and local) bourgeoisie against the popular 
masses on the other. Once all this is understood, then it should be possible to forge 
appropriate class alliances for a total anti-imperialist onslaught. 
THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT 
Transplanting the Seedlings 
And as in private life one differentiates between what a man thinks and says of himself and what he 
really is and does, so in historical struggles one must distinguish still more the phrases and fancies of 
parties from their real organism and their real interests, their conception of themselves, from the reality. 
(Marx, in Shivji 1978 Rep.: 61). 
Armed conflict in Zimbabwe was terminated by negotiation at a marathon constitutional 
conference at Lancaster House in London in 1979. The contending forces at this 
conference were the following : the local settler colonialists led by Ian Smith who had 
declared UDI from Britain in 1965, par t of whose team included a segment of the African 
petty bourgeoisie led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa who had joined the settler colonialists 
in an "internal settlement" in March 1978, on the one hand; and the Patriotic Front 
comprising the armed liberation movements of ZANU-PF and ZAPU on the other. 
Standing as if it were a neutral ring-holder was the British Government represented by 
none other than the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington. In actual fact, from 
historically documented word and deed, (2) the British were a long-time ally of the 
settler colonial and "internal settlement" combination. 
What I seek to establish here is that the Lancaster House Conference and the resultant 
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Agreement and Constitution represented a high point in the struggle of the contending forces, 
a point which was the start of a process of' transition" from settler colonial capitalism 
presided over by an indigenous neo-colonial state. This transition process is here 
euphemistically called the process of transplanting "seedlings" long nurtured in the 
"nursery" beds, to be watered and cultivated on a new setting over a period of about 
seven to 10 years, the period required to expire before any changes in the Lancaster 
House Constitution (LHC) could be made. Thereafter, the "seedlings" would have 
reached their "own maturity" and the reproduction of "capitalist gardening" itself would 
be more or less guaranteed. It is pertinent in this context then to look at the salient 
features of the Lancaster House Agreement and see how they were the provisions for 
the beginning of this "transplanting" process. 
Fostering the development of an indigenous African "middle class" which would 
constitute a "buffer" between colonial capitalism and the "rest of the masses" was the 
yearning of "liberal colonialists" from very early days. The National Trade Unions 
Survey (NTUS, 1984) records the colonial state's fear of the working classes' politics 
thus: 
The colonial state feared the prospects of trade unionism developing into radical political movements. 
Prime Minister Huggins .... expressed the concern and desire of the rising bourgeoisie class to control 
trade unionism and radical politics by creating an African petty bourgeois class that would be a "buffer 
class" allied with the white settler bourgeoisie against the rural and urban African working class. In the 
midst of peasant and proletarian upheavals of 1954, Huggins further declared the need for an African 
buffer class: "We shall never be able to do much with these people until we have established a native 
middle class" (NTUS: 1984,16). 
The racial partnership ideology and economic programmes of the Huggins era of the 
1950s was simply to cultivate this settler colonial and African petty bourgeois alliance. 
It was the resistance of mainly the settler agrarian-based bourgeoisie and settler 
labour-aristocracy which checked colonial liberalism. However, later, these same 
segments led by Ian Smith were forced by war and other forces to attempt such an 
alliance with the March 3 1978 "internal settlement" (already referred to). Such alliances 
were from time to time tried by attempts at splitting the Patriotic Front guerilla 
movement (Mandaza, op.cit., 36-37). 
It is at Lancaster House that the basics of neo-colonialism were carved. First and 
foremost, the reproduction of the system of imperialist-dominated capitalism was to be 
ensured. In every struggle, differing perhaps only in terms of degree and form, the masses 
of the people become involved politically. They enter the political stage and their 
protagonism, given the existence of other conducive conditions, chief of all being an 
appropriate leadership with a correct popular ideology, can pose a potential for the 
profound reconstitution of the society. The Zimbabwe struggle did appear to pose this 
potential. Yet, the outward pronouncements notwithstanding, none in the leadership of the 
national, popular liberation movements espoused an ideology which contained within it a 
serious programme for the radical reconstitution of society. 
Yet, the fact of this "potential" and the primary need to cultivate and entrench a 
pro-capitalist neo-colonial ruling class meant that the combination of settler and 
imperialist capital would not gamble but ensure on paper the reproduction of the 
dominant socio-economic system. The following provisions of the Lancaster House 
Agreement bear this out. 
First and foremost, the Lancaster House Agreement brought about a Constitution which 
required the recognition of the sanctity of the institution ofprivate property in the means of 
10 
production. (See Section 16 of the Constitution: Freedom from Deprivation of 
Property). This sanctity was to be guarded not just by such constitutional provision but 
by a mechanism which required that there be 20 reserved parliamentary seats for white 
settlers in the new 100-member House of Assembly and 10 in the Senate. To change 
the Constitution before 10 years was up, the new governing party would need a 100 
percent affirmative vote of the parliamentarians. The reserved white seats could not be 
abolished within seven years from the date of independence without a 100 percent 
affirmative vote in the House of Assembly (See Ncube and Nzombe: Zimbabwe Law 
Review, Vol. 5,1987, 8). 
This was particularly damaging with respect to the land issue. To bar the expropriation 
of land from settlers who had usurped it was to slap in the face the entire mass of the 
colonized people for whom land was a burning issue. However, white settlers would not 
have voted for the abolition of the parliamentary seats. Thus, their seven years in 
Parliament was guaranteed. Neither could the Constitution be changed within those 
seven years without their consent, thus major constitutional changes were oufi of the 
question for at least 10 years! 
Amending the Lancaster House Constitution 
By the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No. 61987, on August 21, the reserved 
white seats were abolished and replaced by open seats filled through election by the 
remaining 80 members of the House of Assembly and 20 senators. Correctly, the 
question which has been posed is: Of what significance is the abolition of the reserved 
white seats? Again Ncube and Nzombe offer an interesting argument: The role of the 
white seats was to control the political and economic direction of the state. The settler 
bourgeoisie's economic dominance constituted a power base to influence political 
direction. In fact, Ncube and Nzombe continue, arguing that the settler bourgeoisie and 
imperialism have no need for the white seats anymore! The removal of white seats 
did/does not signal the changing of the distribution of power, resources and wealth! 
Significantly, racist politics was ended but "the fundamental dichotomy is no longer 
between black and white, but between the propertied and the dispossessed classes " 
(ibid., 12). The authors above have, in fact, asserted elsewhere that: 
The entrenchment of the reserved white parliamentary seats for seven years and the protection of private 
property for 10 years were clever imperialist manoeuvres. The imperialists gambled that after 10 years 
a black government that would have won power at independence would have been co-opted into the 
capitalist system and would accordingly not be willing to interfere with the capitalist system and private 
property mostly owned by foreign multinationals, individuals and white locals. (Journal on Social 
Change and Development (JSCD), 1987:12) 
Scientific analysis and prediction usually has the painful aspect of proving true, the truth 
being itself painful to those not enthusiastic about accepting it. Like the authors above, 
I have noted elsewhere and I quote to some length my observation then that: 
The Lancaster House Constitution ... - which was itself an instrument to guarantee non-disruption of 
the capitalist mode of production - was safeguarded by the institutionalisation, appearing as if it were 
an institutionalisation of racism, in the form of 20 white seats in Parliament, was a fundamental 
requirement for the reproduction of imperialist-dominated capitalism in independent Zimbabwe, in 
conditions where a real possibility for a national democratic revolution taking place and affecting a 
greater part of the spheres of the socio-economic formation seemed to exist. The Lancaster House 
Conference and Constitution were concrete methods of institutional demobilisation of this possibility." 
(in Stoneman, op.cit., 261-262). 
Perhaps after April 1990, when the Lancaster House Constitution can be amended or 
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it, there is nothing opprobrious about protecting the rights of minorities, the point is, in 
the context of Zimbabwe, who were the minorities? They were the white settlers only 
and there was no consideration of other ethnic minorities. 
The question of minorities was given a racial interpretation. Such a narrow interpretation also coincided 
with British imperialist interests in that it is the white settlers who were the custodians of capitalism in 
this country. Therefore, protecting their interests by entrenching such protection in the Constitution 
also meant entrenching and protecting the fundamental principles of capitalist relations of production 
and social organisation (ibid., 11). 
However, even on this, it can be concluded that this kind of protection of "white minority 
interests" is no longer necessary as a condition for the reproduction of the dominant 
economic system. The class "seedlings" already transplanted and cultivated can take care 
of this reproduction, even by repressive means. 
Another feature of the Lancaster House Constitution which has seen some 
post-independence "reform" is that of Executive Presidency. The LHC itself had 
provided for a purely ceremonial post of President while actual power lay with the Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet. By the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No. 7 of 
1987 the ceremonial presidency was replaced with the Executive Presidency. By 
amendments to the Constitution, the Executive President became Head of State, Head 
of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. All executive 
authority became vested in the President who may exercise it directly or through the 
Vice-President. He exercises this authority - unless otherwise provided - on advice of 
his Cabinet which he alone appoints or fires. He acts on his own discretion in respect 
of the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment and removal of any Minister or 
the Vice-President (ibid., 13). 
He can declare war, make peace, proclaim and terminate martial law without reference 
to Parliament, though he must do so on the advice of his Cabinet. But the Cabinet serves 
only at the unlimited pleasure of the President and, therefore, was not intended to and 
cannot be a check or restraint on the President (ibid.). 
Only Parliament can approve (within 14 days) the President's declaration of a State of 
Emergency, and can remove the President from office before his six-year term expires 
for wilful violation of the Constitution, or incapacity to perform his duties or when he 
has committed gross misconduct. However, although Parliament can pass a vote of no 
confidence in the President, the President can either dissolve Parliament, or dismiss his 
Cabinet or resign his office. He can, in fact, dissolve Parliament and proclaim martial 
law if that Parliament passes a vote of no confidence in him. This renders Parliament, 
as Ncube and Nzombe suggest, "a kind of toothless bulldog" (ibid., 14). 
The concentration of executive powers in the Presidency is quite enormous. But the 
important question is: In whose interest will that power be exercised? (ibid). Ncube and 
Nzombe posed it thus and are awaiting the answer with the passage of time. 
Yet again we can enumerate some leads in answer to this question with an analysis of 
more recent developments. So far these presidential powers have not been used in the 
interests of the working classes. The nation was shocked to hear the Presidential pardon 
for the ex-Minister of State for Political Affairs, Frederick Shava, who had been jailed 
for lying to the Sandura Commission of Inquiry into the Distribution of Motor Vehicles. 
The nation further got a shock when the President declared that "perjury was not a crime" 
and it was not what the Commission was inquiring into. This pronouncement, together 
with the pardon, prompted the Attorney-General to declare that there would be no more 
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thrown out and a new one put in place, we shall see a new Constitution reflecting the 
desire to establish a full national democratic revolution and a basis for a real transition 
to socialism. However, developments during the first half of the 1980s (or to date) 
present a gloomy picture of the possibility for this development. (3) Again, I noted in 
the above work: 
There has been an acceleration of petty accumulation by some petty bourgeois elements, particularly 
in the areas where imperialist capital had little interest. These areas include petty trading in rural and 
urban areas, fringe import and export businesses, small hotel and night-club ventures, housing and 
apartment holding and renting, landholding and pig and poultry production, and so on" (and today I 
can add the corruption involving swindling of State funds, violating allocation of vehicle privileges and 
buying vehicles and selling them at exorbitant prices - even violating pricc control regulations in the 
process) (4), "areas which even the Lancaster House Constitution hoped would provide opportunities 
for accumulation by a new indigenous black pro-capitalist class." (ibid.). 
In fact, this class formation which imperialism had gambled on its developing over a 
period of seven to 10 years accelerated immediately after independence. That is why I 
insist that the Lancaster House Conference and Agreement were the start of a process 
of transplanting class seedlings from capitalist nursery seedbeds! As early as 1983, Mr 
Mugabe, then Prime Minister, attacked what he termed "bourgeois Ministers, civil 
servants and people in public office" who were accumulating wealth! At the Second 
Congress of his party, ZANU-PF, the following year, a "Leadership Code" was adopted 
and for Mugabe, the party leaders had two options : "to quit their posts or to relinquish 
their property, 'for they could not have it both ways'" (ibid.). 
The Leadership Code itself forbids party leaders and their relatives from owning 
businesses, receiving more than one salary, serving as director of a private firm or 
business organised for profit, or owning real estate or other property from which they 
would receive rents or other royalties or own more than 50 acres of land (ibid., 263). 
As I concluded in my analysis of these developments in the above work, I have no reason 
here to conclude otherwise: 
Under conditions of neo-colonialism, such patterns of class formation are inevitable and are hardly ever 
fought successfully by leadership codes. Concerning this very process of class formation, the then 
ZANU-PF Party's Secretary for Administration, Minister Nyagumbo, declared that the party was 
finding it difficult to implement the dode because 'the leaders have become bourgeois'. Nyagumbo 
even suggested that the party should call an emergency congress to tell the people that because leaders 
had acquired property, scientific socialism was difficult to implement (ibid.). 
As I have indicated in note 4, this Minister was said to have committed suicide upon the 
Sandura Commission's revelation of the extent of his own corruption. Our quotation 
from Marx at the opening of this section could not be more relevant and, true. Indeed, 
as the Lancaster House Agreement sought to accomplish: 
It is these violators of the leadership code ("which they themselves drew up and adopted for 
implementation") who came to constitute the neo-colonial ruling class, who proclaimed the acceptance 
of the reality of capitalism; that "it could not be destroyed overnight", that (conveniently) "socialism 
cannot be built in one day!" The neo-colonialism over which the class presided was precisely what the 
British capitalist state and monopoly/settler capital alliance sought to bring about (ibid). 
Would it not be reductio ad absurdum to expect this class to expropriate itself after April 
1990 when the LHC can be torn up and a new one drawn up! 
A second important but related feature of the LHC which sought to ensure the 
reproduction of the imperialist-dominated socio-economic system lay in The 
Declaration of Rights. This enshrined a doctrine called "Safeguards Against the Abuse 
of Majority Power". While, as Ncube and Nzombe point out (ibid., 10), on the face of 
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prosecutions for perjury as it would be a waste of time and resources. These 
developments rendered the judiciary itself a "superfluous" and "toothless bulldog". 
However, the issue is not one ofpardons ofpersons as such, but ofpardons of those persons 
insofar as they are embodiments of a social category or segment of it, that is, a corrupt petty 
bourgeoisie bent on the abuse of State office in order to carve out an economic base for 
itself, in order to achieve primitive accumulation of capital in a primitive way. 
When the University of Zimbabwe students recently sought to commemorate their 29th 
September 1988 anti-corruption demonstration, they were viciously dealt with by riot 
police, leading to the arrest of several of them on charges of publishing subversive 
literature. This was followed by the closure of the University. The Zimbabwe Congress 
of Trade Unions (ZCTU) secretary-general, Morgan Tsvangirai, was arrested after 
issuing a statement in support of the students and criticising the closure of the University. 
He was subsequently charged with being a South African agent! And this, after the court 
had ordered his release on the grounds that he had no case to answer! Judging from the 
Presidential pronouncements on these matters, there was a very remote possibility 
indeed that the Presidential powers would be used in favour of students or the labour 
leader. The labour leader was subsequently released with all charges against him 
dropped. Clearly, there is no doubt that the State had intended to harass the citizen 
purely for bravely supporting students' actions and for criticising the closure of the 
University. A few months later, the arrested students were also released and charges 
against them dropped - all had already been thrown out by the courts in any case -
supposedly in order to repair State-student relations! There was no use of Presidential 
prerogatives in these releases as such. 
Perhaps the more important point to note is that the President is the personification of the 
classes that rule, and those classes are not the working classes, but the combination of the 
imperialist, the local white settler and the black petty bourgeois blocs. The conjunction of 
forces at the level of the State simply presents a balance of power which is currently 
tilted not in favour of the working classes - on whom many students have their social 
base - but of the latter classes. Again, one can suggest that the thesis argued here is 
confirmed by the class basis and orientation of the Members of Parliament appointed 
by the President after the abolition of the reserved white seats. (See note 3). Organised 
labour actually protested against these appointments and argued for their own 
representatives to be also appointed. This was rejected on the grounds that if the 
workers were members of ZANU-PF, then they have the petty bourgeoisie in 
Parliament (mainly business people) representing them already! TTiey were further 
advised not to seek to have their own "selfish sectional interests" represented! 
Apparently, only the captains of industry and agrarian capital could seek such 
representation! 
THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN STATE 
In the work edited by Stoneman, Davies attempts, through a sociological interrogation 
of State actions, to determine whether Zimbabwe was on a course of "transition" to 
socialism or not. He elects to consider areas like social services (health and education), 
nationalisation of industry, wages policies and industrial relations so as to be able to 
denote the class character of the post-independence State. He concludes that in social 
services, there has been a quantitative expansion, true, but qualitatively, nothing points 
to a socialist direction. Instead, a capitalist welfarism is reflected more than a transition 
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production. (See Section 16 of the Constitution: Freedom from Deprivation of 
Property). This sanctity was to be guarded not just by such constitutional provision but 
by a mechanism which required that there be 20 reserved parliamentary seats for white 
settlers in the new 100-member House of Assembly and 10 in the Senate. To change 
the Constitution before 10 years was up, the new governing party would need a 100 
percent affirmative vote of the parliamentarians. The reserved white seats could not be 
abolished within seven years from the date of independence without a 100 percent 
affirmative vote in the House of Assembly (See Ncube and Nzombe: Zimbabwe Law 
Review,V ol. 5,1987,8). 
This was particularly damaging with respect to the land issue. To bar the expropriation 
of land from settlers who had usurped it was to slap in the face the entire mass of the 
colonized people for whom land was a burning issue. However, white settlers would not 
have voted for the abolition of the parliamentary seats. Thus, their seven years in 
Parliament was guaranteed. Neither could the Constitution be changed within those 
seven years without their consent, thus major constitutional changes were out] of the 
question for at least 10 years! / 
Amending the Lancaster House Constitution 
By the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No. 61987, on August 21, the reserved 
white seats were abolished and replaced by open seats filled through election by the 
remaining 80 members of the House of Assembly and 20 senators. Correctly, the 
question which has been posed is: Of what significance is the abolition of the reserved 
white seats? Again Ncube and Nzombe offer an interesting argument: The role of the 
white seats was to control the political and economic direction of the state. The settler 
bourgeoisie's economic dominance constituted a power base to influence political 
direction. In fact, Ncube and Nzombe continue, arguing that the settler bourgeoisie and 
imperialism have no need for the white seats anymore! The removal of white seats 
did/does not signal the changing of the distribution of power, resources and wealth! 
Significantly, racist politics was ended but "the fundamental dichotomy is no longer 
between black and white, but between the propertied and the dispossessed classes " 
(ibid., 12). The authors above have, in fact, asserted elsewhere that: 
The entrenchment of the reserved white parliamentary seats for seven years and the protection of private 
property for 10 years were clever imperialist manoeuvres. The imperialists gambled that after 10 years 
a black government that would have won power at independence would have been co-opted into the 
capitalist system and would accordingly not be willing to interfere with the capitalist system and private 
property mostly owned by foreign multinationals, individuals and white locals. (Journal on Social 
Change and Development (JSCD), 1987:12) 
Scientific analysis and prediction usually has the painful aspect of proving true, the truth 
being itself painful to those not enthusiastic about accepting it. Like the authors above, 
I have noted elsewhere and I quote to some length my observation then that: 
The Lancaster House Constitution ... - which was itself an instrument to guarantee non-disruption of 
the capitalist mode of production - was safeguarded by the institutionalisation, appearing as if it were 
an institutionalisation of racism, in the form of 20 white seats in Parliament, was a fundamental 
requirement for the reproduction of imperialist-dominated capitalism in independent Zimbabwe, in 
conditions where a real possibility for a national democratic revolution taking place and affecting a 
greater part of the spheres of the socio-economic formation seemed to exist. The Lancaster House 
Conference and Constitution were concrete methods of institutional demobilisation of this possibility." 
(in Stoneman, op.cit., 261-262). 
Perhaps after April 1990, when the Lancaster House Constitution can be amended or 
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it, there is nothing opprobrious about protecting the rights of minorities, the point is, in 
the context of Zimbabwe, who were the minorities? They were the white settlers only 
and there was no consideration of other ethnic minorities. 
The question of minorities was given a racial interpretation. Such a narrow interpretation also coincided 
with British imperialist interests in that it is the white settlers who were the custodians of capitalism in 
this country. Therefore, protecting their interests by entrenching such protection in the Constitution 
also meant entrenching and protecting the fundamental principles of capitalist relations of production 
and social organisation (ibid., 11). 
However, even on this, it can be concluded that this kind of protection of "white minority 
interests" is no longer necessary as a condition for the reproduction of the dominant 
economic system. The class"seedlings" already transplanted and cultivated can take care 
of this reproduction, even by repressive means. 
Another feature of the Lancaster House Constitution which has seen some 
post-independence "reform" is that of Executive Presidency. The LHC itself had 
provided for a purely ceremonial post of President while actual power lay with the Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet. By the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No. 7 of 
1987 the ceremonial presidency was replaced with the Executive Presidency. By 
amendments to the Constitution, the Executive President became Head of State, Head 
of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. All executive 
authority became vested in the President who may exercise it directly or through the 
Vice-President. He exercises this authority - unless otherwise provided - on advice of 
his Cabinet which he alone appoints or fires. He acts on his own discretion in respect 
of the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment and removal of any Minister or 
the Vice-President (ibid., 13). 
He can declare war, make peace, proclaim and terminate martial law without reference 
to Parliament, though he must do so on the advice of his Cabinet. But the Cabinet serves 
only at the unlimited pleasure of the President and, therefore, was not intended to and 
cannot be a check or restraint on the President (ibid.). 
Only Parliament can approve (within 14 days) the President's declaration of a State of 
Emergency, and can remove the President from office before his six-year term expires 
for wilful violation of the Constitution, or incapacity to perform his duties or when he 
has committed gross misconduct. However, although Parliament can pass a vote of no 
confidence in the President, the President can either dissolve Parliament, or dismiss his 
Cabinet or resign his office. He can, in fact, dissolve Parliament and proclaim martial 
law if that Parliament passes a vote of no confidence in him. This renders Parliament, 
as Ncube and Nzombe suggest, "a kind of toothless bulldog" (ibid., 14). 
The concentration of executive powers in the Presidency is quite enormous. But the 
important question is: In whose interest will that power be exercised? (ibid). Ncube and 
Nzombe posed it thus and are awaiting the answer with the passage of time. 
Yet again we can enumerate some leads in answer to this question with an analysis of 
more recent developments. So far these presidential powers have not been used in the 
interests of the working classes. The nation was shocked to hear the Presidential pardon 
for the ex-Minister of State for Political Affairs, Frederick Shava, who had been jailed 
for lying to the Sandura Commission of Inquiry into the Distribution of Motor Vehicles. 
The nation further got a shock when the President declared that "perjury was not a crime" 
and it was not what the Commission was inquiring into. This pronouncement, together 
with the pardon, prompted the Attorney-General to declare that there would be no more 
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thrown out and a new one put in place, we shall see a new Constitution reflecting the 
desire to establish a full national democratic revolution and a basis for a real transition 
to socialism. However, developments during the first half of the 1980s (or to date) 
present a gloomy picture of the possibility for this development. (3) Again, I noted in 
the above work: 
There has been an acceleration of petty accumulation by some petty bourgeois elements, particularly 
in the areas where imperialist capital had little interest. These areas include petty trading in rural and 
urban areas, fringe import and export businesses, small hotel and night-club ventures, housing and 
apartment holding and renting, landholding and pig and poultry production, and so on" (and today I 
can add the corruption involving swindling of State funds, violating allocation of vehicle privileges and 
buying vehicles and selling them at exorbitant prices - even violating pricc control regulations in the 
process) (4), "areas which even the Lancaster House Constitution hoped would provide opportunities 
for accumulation by a new indigenous black pro-capitalist class." (ibid.). 
In fact, this class formation which imperialism had gambled on its developing over a 
period of seven to 10 years accelerated immediately after independence. That is why I 
insist that the Lancaster House Conference and Agreement were the start of a process 
of transplanting class seedlings from capitalist nursery seedbeds! As early as 1983, Mr 
Mugabe, then Prime Minister, attacked what he termed "bourgeois Ministers, civil 
servants and people in public office" who were accumulating wealth! At the Second 
Congress of his party, ZANU-PF, the following year, a "Leadership Code" was adopted 
and for Mugabe, the party leaders had two options: "to quit their posts or to relinquish 
their property, 'for they could not have it both ways'" (ibid.). 
The Leadership Code itself forbids party leaders and their relatives from owning 
businesses, receiving more than one salary, serving as director of a private firm or 
business organised for profit, or owning real estate or other property from which they 
would receive rents or other royalties or own more than 50 acres of land (ibid., 263). 
As I concluded in my analysis of these developments in the above work, I have no reason 
here to conclude otherwise: 
Under conditions of neo-colonialism, such patterns of class formation are inevitable and are hardly ever 
fought successfully by leadership codes. Concerning this very process of class formation, the then 
ZANU-PF Party's Secretary for Administration, Minister Nyagumbo, declared that the party was 
finding it difficult to implement the dode because 'the leaders have become bourgeois'. Nyagumbo 
even suggested that the party should call an emergency congress to tell the people that because leaders 
had acquired property, scientific socialism was difficult to implement (ibid.). 
As I have indicated in note 4, this Minister was said to have committed suicide upon the 
Sandura Commission's revelation of the extent of his own corruption. Our quotation 
from Marx at the opening of this section could not be more relevant and, true. Indeed, 
as the Lancaster House Agreement sought to accomplish: 
It is these violators of the leadership code ("which they themselves drew up and adopted for 
implementation") who came to constitute the neo-colonial ruling class, who proclaimed the acceptance 
of the reality of capitalism; that "it could not be destroyed overnight", that (conveniently) "socialism 
cannot be built in one day!" The neo-colonialism over which the class presided was precisely what the 
British capitalist state and monopoly/settler capital alliance sought to bring about (ibid.). 
Would it not bQreductio ad absurdum to expect this class to expropriate itself after April 
1990 when the LHC can be torn up and a new one drawn up! 
A second important but related feature of the LHC which sought to ensure the 
reproduction of the imperialist-dominated socio-economic system lay in The 
Declaration of Rights. This enshrined a doctrine called "Safeguards Against the Abuse 
of Majority Power". While, as Ncube and Nzombe point out (ibid., 10), on the face of 
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prosecutions for perjury as it would be a waste of time and resources. These 
developments rendered the judiciary itself a "superfluous" and "toothless bulldog". 
However, the issue is not one ofpardons ofpersons as such, but ofpardons of those persons 
insofar as they are embodiments of a social category or segment of it, that is, a corrupt petty 
bourgeoisie bent on the abuse of State office in order to carve out an economic base for 
itself, in order to achieve primitive accumulation of capital in a primitive way. 
When the University of Zimbabwe students recently sought to commemorate their 29th 
September 1988 anti-corruption demonstration, they were viciously dealt with by riot 
police, leading to the arrest of several of them on charges of publishing subversive 
literature. This was followed by the closure of the University. The Zimbabwe Congress 
of Trade Unions (ZCTU) secretary-general, Morgan Tsvangirai, was arrested after 
issuing a statement in support of the students and criticising the closure of the University. 
He was subsequently charged with being a South African agent! And this, after the court 
had ordered his release on the grounds that he had no case to answer! Judging from the 
Presidential pronouncements on these matters, there was a very remote possibility 
indeed that the Presidential powers would be used in favour of students or the labour 
leader. The labour leader was subsequently released with all charges against him 
dropped. Clearly, there is no doubt that the State had intended to harass the citizen 
purely for bravely supporting students' actions and for criticising the closure of the 
University. A few months later, the arrested students were also released and charges 
against them dropped - all had already been thrown out by the courts in any case -
supposedly in order to repair State-student relations! There was no use of Presidential 
prerogatives in these releases as such. 
Perhaps the more important point to note is that the President is the personification of the 
classes that rule, and those classes are not the working classes, but the combination of the 
imperialist, the local white settler and the black petty bourgeois blocs. The conjunction of 
forces at the level of the State simply presents a balance of power which is currently 
tilted not in favour of the working classes - on whom many students have their social 
base - but of the latter classes. Again, one can suggest that the thesis argued here is 
confirmed by the class basis and orientation of the Members of Parliament appointed 
by the President after the abolition of the reserved white seats. (See note 3). Organised 
labour actually protested against these appointments and argued for their own 
representatives to be also appointed. This was rejected on the grounds that if the 
workers were members of ZANU-PF, then they have the petty bourgeoisie in 
Parliament (mainly business people) representing them already! They were further 
advised not to seek to have their own "selfish sectional interests" represented! 
Apparently, only the captains of industry and agrarian capital could seek such 
representation! 
THE NATURE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN STATE 
In the work edited by Stoneman, Davies attempts, through a sociological interrogation 
of State actions, to determine whether Zimbabwe was on a course of "transition" to 
socialism or not. He elects to consider areas like social services (health and education), 
nationalisation of industry, wages policies and industrial relations so as to be able to 
denote the class character of the post-independence State. He concludes that in social 
services, there has been a quantitative expansion, true, but qualitatively, nothing points 
to a socialist direction. Instead, a capitalist welfarism is reflected more than a transition 
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to socialism (Stoneman, op.cit,. 22-23). 
On nationalisation (in fact, there has not been anything of this sort in Zimbabwe), rather, 
on State intervention and public investment in productive activities, he finds that there 
has only been a rescue of capitalist "lame ducks" while the parastatals are mainly colonial 
inheritances which have not been transformed. Indeed, with the 1987-88 Parliamentary 
Committee of Inquiry Reports on these parastatals, the same attacks on them have been 
made as those of elsewhere in Africa. On this, Davies concludes: 
Thus it can be argued that in this important area of State intervention, we cannot be certain what the 
class character of the intervention has been. It could at best be argued that there has been some advance 
made in laying the foundations for State control of industry upon which a transitional policy could be 
based; but it could equally be the basis for the development of the petty- and grand-bourgeoisie (ibid.). 
I think we can be certain that if there is a class that is nourished on the basis of these 
interventions, that class is. certainly not of workers and peasants. For, as Davies says, 
"the class character of state-owned organisations depends entirely on the class character 
of the State..." (ibid.). I argued in the same work that perhaps we can be sure of which 
class has the basis of State intervention as its economic protoplasm in neo-colonial 
Zimbabwe: 
And in the attempt to establish a foothold in the economic base, the petty bourgeoisie has at its disposal 
the apparatus of State. Hence the buying of shares by the State (so-called State participation) in some 
sub-sectors or branches of the economy, mainly in the ailing ones! (the "lame ducks" that Davies refers 
to!). 
Nevertheless, this process accelerates a neo-colonial class formation in which a certain 
type of anti-socialist bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie develops through appointments to 
"Boards of Directors" and "shadow" managements of the State-cum-private sector 
ventures. This petty bourgeoisie becomes an ally of imperialism because: 
• the general structure of the political economy dominated by imperialism has not 
changed; 
• it is only a "shadow" management implementing real decisions which are taken 
in the metropolis, the proportion of shares held by the host State notwithstanding. 
This shadow petty bourgeqis partner is at a disadvantage since the imperialist 
partners have more knowledge available to them concerning the productive 
operation of the enterprise. 
(Here I mention the example of Rio Tinto whose Empress Mine was rescued by the 
State from collapse. At the occasion, its financial director declared that it would be 
the best scenario if the Government of Zimbabwe owned 51 percent of the shares but 
"left the company to run the management without any interference from 
Government.... After all, they (the company) knew the business.") 
• without a radical element armed with a proletarian ideology and having organic 
links with the masses, particularly with the working class, being organiser of this 
anti-imperialism, the reactionary petty bourgeoisie fills these management posts 
either with an incompetent element that is ideologically bankrupt in terms of the 
philosophy of socialist transformation, or that is anti-socialist pure and simple, 
and sees its appointment as an opportunity to establish links with foreign capital 
for purposes of carving a base for its own primitive accumulation. Corrupt 
appointments on the basis of "class friends", "ethnic comrades", or "regional home 
boys" take precedence over radical ideological inclination, competence and 
qualification for the job and recognition that the task is a struggle which is part of 
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the general class struggle against imperialism." (Here I cite the upheavals in the 
Board meetings of a parastatal, the Industrial Development Corporation - by 
which The Sunday Mail of 22 September 1985 was precipitated to urge the 
Government to appoint personnel on the basis of merit rather ethnicity!) (ibid., 
272 - 273). 
In the areas of wage policy and industrial relations, Davies acknowledged the progressive 
nature of the setting of minimum wages. However, the problem with this is that the 
mechanism of wage increases has become that of wage increase controls. Indeed, those 
workers who have bargained with their employers and achieved certain margins of 
increases have seen those agreements nullified by government. Some, like the leather 
and footwear industry workers were threatened with imprisonment after striking for 
implementation of what they had agreed with their employers (5). The imprisonment 
of employees has been a mechanism the Zimbabwean post-independence State has 
resorted to on a number of occasions, for example, the striking junior doctors in June 
1989, the striking Posts and Telecommunications Corporation technicians and the 
National Railways of Zimbabwe artisans around the same time! 
In industrial relations in general, a new law came into existence, the Labour Relations 
Act (LRA) (1985) to repeal the pre-existing colonial legislation. However, although it 
recognised the right of trade unions to exist, it gave immense powers to the Minister of 
Labour, and its wide range of what are called "essential services", in which no strikes are 
allowed, rendered trade unions "superfluous". In fact, both the LRA and the political 
attitude to the labour movement subordinates labour to the State and political party,yet 
there is no effective representation of the working-class in any of the organs of State and 
party, neither is there a radical pro-working class element strategically placed within the 
leadership of the party for the working-class cause to be effectively advanced. As Davies 
concludes: 
The policy of subordinating unions to the ruling party is in form consistent with socialism. But in a 
situation like Zimbabwe's, where the party is not a vanguard party and where its class position is still 
ambiguous, it must be regarded as a means for control rather than for the advancement of the organised 
working class (ibid., 25). 
Davies concludes that Zimbabwe is simply on a road of capitalist development with a 
welfare-reformist character to it. He says: 
... we find it difficult to explain why Zimbabwe should be regarded as transitional rather than just 
capitalist; it is not at all clear whether the base for transition is being strengthened or not. The 
transitional image is largely imparted by the self-assertions by ZANU that this is its policy. Objectively, 
however, it is just easy to argue that the Zimbabwean programme is one of capitalist development rather 
than of transition to socialism (ibid., 29-30). 
The problem we are faced with when seeking to characterise the present State is that we get 
locked in the debate on whether it is this or that, socialist or capitalist, neo-colonial or 
post-white settler coloniall Although characterising the present is necessary in order to 
plan a strategy for the way forward, there must always be a guarding against the drowning 
of thought as to which way forward. For example, I have criticised Mandaza's 
contentment with describing the "post-white settler colonial state", an essentially 
neo-colonial state - never mind the continued social and economic dominance of white 
settlers who, by the way, mostly hold national citizenship in the post-independence 
period (or am I naively expecting that they should be!!) - and failing to categorically state 
the way forward ! Similarly, criticisms can be made of Mr Davies who shows what the 
post-colonial state really is, but only leaves "implied" in his discussion what his hopes for 
the future are! 
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CONCLUSION 
Objective analysis must take a clear partisan political position. 
In conclusion, therefore, I would repeat what I stated elsewhere: 
At Lancaster House, the class forces that objectively had the capacity to be the leading force in the 
transformation of the mode of production were not represented organically for this purpose, except as 
the the people in a "people/power bloc" contradiction led by a petty bourgeois class of nationahst 
militants. We cannot, t h e r e f o r e , justifiably measure the actions o f the present Zimbabwean state on the 
basis of a scientific socialist yardstick, for the socialist project was not seriously on the agenda and could 
not have been, without the working class either being organised, or represented, or acting as a combatant 
class on the stage (ibid., 275). 
Zimbabwe's political economy is dominated by imperialism. The social and economic 
dominance of the white settler component is simply an indicator of the high degree of 
development of capitalism in Zimbabwe. It does not alter or soften Zimbabwe's being 
neo-colonial and presided over by a neo-colonial state which has over the years 
reconciled itself with imperialist and local settler capital - in a word - with 
imperialist-dominated capitalism, whether from South Africa or across the seas! 
Therefore: 
The anti-imperialist struggle in Zimbabwe can only be genuinely prosecuted if a radical pro-working class 
element emerges in the field of the present class struggle, to lead all other sections that have a grievance 
against imperialism in a struggle to achieve a complete national democratic revolution and establish the 
conditions for the transition to socialism. For this struggle to succeed, there must be a leading role for the 
working-class and poor peasantry allied with the anti-imperialist forces (ibid., 273). 
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NOTES 
1.Perhaps this is not fair on Mandaza since he, in fact, does undertake an 
interrogation of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie and concludes that it has never been 
and could never have been "anti-capitalist". It was always pro-capitalist and 
pro-Western and simply wanted to "wear the shoes of the white settlers" (see ibid., pp. 
30-33). The point, however, is that Mandaza's treatise is contradicted sharply by the 
apologia for the petty bourgeoisie that it contains. Thus, his whole discourse 
becomes more descriptive rather than analytical and explanatory. It ends up lacking 
thoroughly in terms of logical consistency. 
2. Again see Mandaza (ibid.) for the reference to Britain's long history of connivance 
and duplicity on the "Rhodesia Question" right up to its clear alliance with the 
"internal settlement" experiment at the Lancaster House Conference. See also 
Verrier, A; 1986, and Davidow, J; 1984. 
3.The policy of reconciliation which was pronounced at independence was clearly a 
reconciliation mainly with settler capital. This was seen in the appointment of 
representatives of commerce, industry and agriculture into Parliament by the 
President after the abolition of the reserved white seats. 
4.This latter corruption actually led to the historic demonstration by the University of 
Zimbabwe students on 29 September, 1988. Apart from an attack on corruption, the 
students' historic document of the same date attacked all the features of a classical 
neo-colonial state. Although violently repressed (and grants suspended for some 
students), the State was forced to appoint the now famous "Commission of Inquiry 
into the Distribution of Motor Vehicles" under the chairmanship of the Judge 
President, Mr. Justice W.R. Sandura (Reports published March 1989 and August 
1989, respectively). The revelations of this Commission led to the downfall of several 
Ministers (and the death of one) and some top civil servants, the would-be 
revolutionaries! -
5.See The Worker, November 1987. The Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning 
and Social Welfare declared at the end of August 1989 that he would not hesitate "to 
use emergency powers to deal with 'wildcat' strikes". See The Herald, 01-09-89. 
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